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Lee v. Mowett Sales Co.: North Carolina Retains Its Partial
Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine
Under North Carolina law an unemancipated minor child1 who sustains
injuries due to a parent's negligent operation of a motor vehicle can maintain a
cause of action against the parent for damages. 2 An unemancipated minor child
who sustains injuries as a result of parental negligence under any other circum-
stances, however, has no legally cognizable claim for damages against his or her
parents. 3 What differentiates the injured child's legal rights in these two situa-
tions is the parent-child immunity doctrine.4 This doctrine purportedly recog-
nizes the uniqueness of the parent-child relationship and reduces intrafamily
litigation in the interest of family unity.5
Although North Carolina judicially adopted parent-child immunity in
1923,6 the doctrine no longer exists in its original form. In 1975 the North
Carolina General Assembly abrogated the application of parent-child immunity
in situations in which a child's injuries arise out of a parent's negligent operation
of a motor vehicle. 7 Nevertheless, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Lee v.
Mowett Sales Co. 8 recently reinforced the applicability of the parent-child immu-
nity doctrine in nonmotor vehicle cases.9 This decision comes amidst intense
criticism of the rationale behind the doctrine and a general trend among other
jurisdictions to abolish parent-child immunity. 10
This Note briefly examines the development of the parent-child immunity
doctrine and the major criticisms supporting its abrogation. It discusses paren-
tal immunity in North Carolina and analyzes the North Carolina Supreme
Court's decision in Lee. The Note concludes that the policy reasons underlying
1. An unemancipated minor child is one who depends on his or her parents for support. War-
ren v. Long, 264 N.C. 137, 138, 141 S.E.2d 9, 10 (1965).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Supp. 1985) (parent-child immunity abolished in motor vehi-
cle cases).
3. See, eg., Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 316 N.C. 489, 342 S.E.2d 882 (1986) (third party contri-
bution action by manufacturer against parent of injured, unemancipated child barred by parent-child
immunity). The bar to actions in tort by a child is lifted "by complete emancipation, which may be
by act of the parent, by marriage, by arriving at the age of twenty-one, or by leaving the household
and becoming self-supporting." Warren, 264 N.C. at 138, 141 S.E.2d at 10.
4. The parent-child immunity doctrine denies an unemancipated minor child a cause of action
in tort against his or her parents for negligently inflicted personal injuries. See 3 R. LEE, NORTH
CAROLINA FAMILY LAW §§ 248, 290-91 (4th ed. 1979).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 25-32 (discussing various rationales for parent-child
immunity).
6. See Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
7. Act of June 19, 1975, ch. 685, § 1, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 911, 911 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-539.21 (1975)) provided: "The relationship of parent and child shall not bar the right of
action by a minor child against a parent for personal injury or property damage arising out of the
operation of a motor vehicle owned or operated by such parent." Id. The general assembly
amended the statute in 1985. Act of May 17, 1985, ch. 201, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 167, 167. For
a discussion of the recent amendment, see infra text accompanying notes 92-97.
8. 316 N.C. 489, 342 S.E.2d 882 (1986).
9. Id. at 495, 342 S.E.2d at 886 (holding that parent-child immunity doctrine will continue to
be applied as it now exists in North Carolina).
10. See infra notes 39-40 and text accompanying notes 33-60.
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the parent-child immunity rule do not support partial retention of the doctrine
in North Carolina.
In Lee an unemancipated minor child received severe injuries when her feet
came into contact with a lawn mower operated by her father." The child
brought suit against the manufacturer and seller of the lawn mower for negli-
gence and breach of warranty, alleging that the lawn mower failed to stop when
her father removed his foot from the accelerator. 12 Defendant lMowett Sales
Company [Mowett] denied fault and filed a third-party complaint against plain-
tiff's father alleging that the father's negligent operation of the lawn mower
proximately caused some of plaintiff's injuries.13 Defendant sought contribu-
tion for any damages plaintiff might recover.14 The trial court dismissed defend-
ant's third-party complaint on the grounds that the complaint was barred by the
parent-child immunity doctrine. ' 5 The North Carolina Court of Appeals 16 and
the North Carolina Supreme Court 17 affirmed the dismissal. The supreme court
stated three reasons to support its decision. First, the court reiterated the viabil-
ity of parent-child immunity in North Carolina in nonmotor vehicle cases, not-
ing that because the doctrine barred plaintiff from maintaining a suit, it barred a
third-party action against plaintiff's father.18 Second, the court recognized that
approximately half of the states still apply the doctrine.' 9 Last, the court ex-
pressed its reluctance to carve out exceptions to the doctrine, deferring to the
general assembly any further abolishment of parent-child immunity.20 Two jus-
tices, however, dissented from the decision. Justice Martin urged total abroga-
tion of the parent-child immunity doctrine in North Carolina and Justice Exum
argued that the doctrine should not be extended to actions for contribution by
third parties.
21
11. Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 76 N.C. App. 556, 557, 334 S.E.2d 250, 251 (1985), aff'd, 316




15. Id. The trial court dismissed defendant's third party complaint pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Lee, 76 N.C. App. at 557, 334
S.E.2d at 251.
16. Id. Judge Becton dissented in an extensive argument for total abrogation of parental immu-
nity in North Carolina. See id. at 559, 334 S.E.2d at 252 (Becton, J., dissenting).
17. Lee, 316 N.C. at 490, 342 S.E.2d at 883.
18. Id. at 492, 342 S.E.2d at 884 (citing Watson v. Nichols, 270 N.C. 733, 155 S.E.2d 154
(1967)).
19. Id. at 494, 342 S.E.2d at 885.
20. Id. at 494-95, 342 S.E.2d at 885-86. As stated by the court:
To judicially abolish the parent-child immunity doctrine after the legislature has consid-
ered and retained the doctrine would be to engage in impermissible judicial legislation. If
the doctrine is to be abolished at this late date, it should be done by legislation and not by
the Court .... We decline to adopt judicial "legislation" by abolishing the parent-child
immunity doctrine. The doctrine will continue to be applied as it now exists in North
Carolina until it is abolished or amended by the legislature.
Id.
21. Justice Martin indicated that Lee presented the court with an opportunity to abrogate
parental immunity and "to move our jurisprudence forward with the mainstream of current judicial
thought on the issue." Id. at 495, 342 S.E.2d at 886 (Martin, J., dissenting). Justice Exum argued
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The doctrine of parent-child immunity originated in the United States with-
out roots in English common law.22 In 1891 the Mississippi Supreme Court
judicially created parental immunity in Hewlett v. George.23 Hewlett involved a
married, but unemancipated minor daughter who tried to sue her mother for
wrongful confinement in an insane asylum.24 The court refused to recognize
plaintiff's cause of action against her mother, reasoning that
[t]he peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a
sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the
best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in
court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries
suffered at the hands of the parent. The state, through its criminal
laws, will give the minor child protection from parental violence and
wrong-doing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand.
25
Thus, Hewlett set forth the original rationale for parental immunity-mainte-
nance of family harmony.
Later cases involving intentional parental torts crystallized the immunity
doctrine and further defined its rationale.2 6 In Roller v. Roller2 7 the Washing-
ton Supreme Court dismissed a suit for civil damages brought by a fifteen-year-
old girl against her father, who had been convicted of raping her.28 The Roller
court asserted two reasons for adopting the parent-child immunity doctrine.
First, the court indicated that if a child were to recover a judgment from his or
her parent, such parent could inherit the "very property which had been wrested
by the law from' him" in the event of the child's death.29 Second, the court
emphasized the injustice that could occur if an injured child recovered damages
from his or her parents and imperiled the financial welfare of other family
members.
30
As additional states adopted the parent-child immunity doctrine, two more
justifications for the doctrine developed. Many courts cited interference with a
parent's discipline and control in caring for a child as a reason to disallow per-
that the policy reasons justifying parent-child immunity do not apply to cross-claims by third-party
plaintiffs who are not children of the defendant. Id. at 496, 342 S.E.2d at 886 (Exum, J., dissenting).
22. See Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 579-80, 591, 118 S.E. 12, 13, 18 (1923) (Clark, J.,
dissenting) (discussing lack of English authority for negligence actions by children against parents).
23. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
24. Id. at 704, 9 So. at 887.
25. Id. at 711,9 So. at 887. Other courts have used the Hewlett rationale to justify parent-child
immunity. See Thomas v. Inmon, 268 Ark. 221,223, 594 S.W.2d 853, 854 (1980); Pedigo v. Rowley,
101 Idaho 201, 202, 610 P.2d 560, 561 (1980); Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 722, 156 N.W.2d
105, 107-08 (1968); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 579-80, 118 S.E. 12, 13 (1923); Chaffin v.
Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 382, 397 P.2d 771, 775 (1964).
26. See, ag., McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37
Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
27. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
28. Id. at 243, 79 P. at 788-89.
29. Id. at 245, 79 P. at 789; see also Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 722, 156 N.W.2d 105, 110
(1968) (if parent is compelled to pay money damages to a child, parent may recoup money in the
event of child's death during minority).
30. Roller, 37 Wash. at 245, 79 P. at 789. Other courts have similarly reasoned that suits
between child and parent deplete family funds. See Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 722, 156
N.W.2d 105, 110 (1968); Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 480, 189 S.E.2d 230, 232 (1972).
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sonal injury actions by a child against a parent. 31 In addition, courts often re-
ferred to the danger of collusion between parent and child leading to fraudulent
claims against insurance companies as a basis to support parent-child
immunity.
32
Although the majority of American courts followed Hewlett and adopted
parental immunity, the doctrine did not long remain in its original, all-inclusive
form. Courts often created exceptions to the doctrine when parents intention-
ally injured their children 33 or someone acted in loco parentis.34 Some courts
made exceptions when the child sustained injury while the parent acted in a
business rather than a parental capacity, 35 or when injury resulted from a motor
vehicle accident.36 Partial abolishment of parent-child immunity first occurred
in the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, Goller v. White,37 a full seventy-two
years after promulgation of the doctrine. Since Goller 38 numerous jurisdictions
have abolished or modified their parental immunity rules.39 This trend toward
31. See, eg., Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 718, 156 N.W.2d 105, 107-08 (1968); Luster v.
Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 481, 13 N.E.2d 438, 439 (1938), overruled in Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass.
350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 584, 118 S.E. 12, 15 (1923).
32. See, eg., Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 483, 13 N.E.2d 438, 440 (1938), overruled in
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975); Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 252-
53, 163 A.2d 147, 150 (1960), overruled in France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d.
490 (1970); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 301, 135 A.2d 65, 73 (1957).
33. See, eg., Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 276 Ark. 230, 633 S.W.2d 366 (1982); Emery v.
Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (en banc); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d
152 (1952); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Teramano v. Teramano, 6
Ohio St. 2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 (1966).
34. See, e.g., Rayburn v. Moore, 241 So. 2d 675 (Miss. 1970); Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180,
24 N.W. 730 (1885). A person acting in loco parentis acts "in the place of a parent; charged, ficti-
tiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (5th ed.
1979).
35. See, e.g., Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963); Foy v. Foy Ee. Co.,
231 N.C. 161, 56 S.E.2d 418 (1949); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
36. See, eg., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla.
1982); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 611 P.2d 135 (1980); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369
Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975); Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971).
37. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
38. For a discussion of Wisconsin's partial abolition of parental immunity, see infra text accom-
panying notes 121-31.
39. Seven states have entirely abolished parental immunity: Hawaii, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. See Peterson v. City of Honolulu, 51 Haw.
484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1969); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Briere v. Briere,
107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297
N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969); Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974)
(New York does not recognize a duty to supervise, however, and parents cannot be held liable for
failure to supervise); Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d 326,474 N.E.2d 275 (1984); Falco v. Pados,
444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980).
California and Minnesota have replaced parental immunity with a reasonable parent standard.
See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (en banc); Anderson v.
Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
One state, Oregon, has replaced parental immunity with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 895G (1977) criteria for determining tortious and privileged parental conduct. See Winn v.
Gilroy, 296 Or. 718, 681 P.2d 776 (1984).
Ten states have abrogated parental immunity except in situations involving parental authority
or discretion: Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Texas, Vermont,
and Wisconsin. See Sandoval v. Sandoval, 128 Ariz. 11, 623 P.2d 800 (1981) (en bane); Illinois Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner, 83 Il1. App. 3d 234, 403 N.E.2d 1256 (1980); Turner v. Turner, 304
N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1981); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970); Plumley v. Klein, 388
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abolishing or minimizing parent-child immunity is based on a range of legal
criticism and refutation of the policy underlying the doctrine.4°
The weakest of the five justifications for the parent-child immunity rule, the
possibility that the tortfeasor parent will inherit any recovery in the event of the
child's death,4 1 can be attacked in three respects. First, any compensatory dam-
ages recovered by the child are likely to be expended before the child's death. 42
Second, the ultimate inheritance of a recovery by a tortfeasor is a possible out-
come in any intrafamily suit,43 yet other family members are allowed to sue one
Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972); Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (Missouri
does not allow suit when it would seriously disturb family tranquility); Stevens v. Scott, 706 S.W.2d
278 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 330 A.2d 335 (1974); Felderhoff V.
Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 370 A.2d 191 (1977); Goller v.
White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
Fifteen states have abrogated parental immunity when injury arises from negligence in a motor
vehicle accident: Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.
See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572c (West Supp.
1985); Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 200 Conn. 290, 512 A.2d 130 (1986) (Connecticut does not recognize
immunity for parents who negligently injure their children while conducting business activity away
from home); Ooms v. Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 316 A.2d 783 (1972); Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682
(Del. 1979) (Delaware preserves parental immunity when parental discretion is involved); Williams
v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976) (immunity abrogated only to extent of a parent's liability
insurance coverage); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982) (immunity abrogated only to extent of
a parent's liability insurance coverage); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 611 P.2d 135
(1980); Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d
907 (1975) (immunity abrogated only to extent of a parent's liability insurance coverage); Trans-
america Ins. Co. v. Royale, 202 Mont. 173, 656 P.2d 820 (1983); Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 27,
627 P.2d 869 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1983); Triplett v. Triplett, 34 N.C. App. 212, 237
S.E.2d 546 (1977); Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984) (immunity abrogated only to extent
of a parent's liability insurance coverage); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013 (R.I. 1982); Smith v. Kauff-
man, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411, 610 P.2d 891
(1980); Lee v. Comer, 159 W. Va. 585, 224 S.E.2d 721 (1976).
Thirteen states still retain parental immunity: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. See Hill v.
Giordano, 447 So. 2d 164 (Ala. 1984) (per curiam); Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 276 Ark. 230,
633 S.W.2d 366 (1982) (Arkansas permits a child to sue a parent for willful and wanton conduct);
Thomas v. Inmon, 268 Ark. 221, 594 S.W.2d 853 (1980); Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 526 P.2d
304 (1974) (en banc); Coleman v. Coleman, 157 Ga. App. 533, 278 S.E.2d 114 (1981); Pedigo v.
Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 610 P.2d 560 (1980); Buffalo v. Buffalo, 441 N.E.2d 711 (Ind. Ct. App.
1982) (Indiana does not recognize immunity for a noncustodial parent when marriage is dissolved
prior to the child's injury); Vaughan v. Vaughan, 161 Ind. App. 497, 316 N.E.2d 455 (1974);
Boundurant v. Boundurant, 386 So. 2d 705 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (Louisiana recognizes immunity for
married or custodial parents); Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1985); McNeal v. Estate of
McNeal, 254 So. 2d 521 (Miss. 1971); Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 99 N.W.2d 16 (1959); Camp-
bell v. Gruttemeyer, 222 Tenn. 133, 432 S.W.2d 894 (1968); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah
1980); Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1971).
40. See, eg., Berman, Time to Abolish Parent-Child Tort Immunity. A Call to Repudiate Missis-
sippi's Gift to the American Family, 4 NOVA L.J. 25 (1980) (discussing history and rationales of
parent-child immunity, urging total abrogation); Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in
Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (1982) (critically evaluating justifications for par-
ent-child immunity and urging courts and legislatures to abandon doctrine); McCurdy, Torts Be-
tween Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030 (1930) (discussing development of
parent-child immunity and doctrine's shortcomings); Comment, Parent-Child Immunity: The Case
for Abolition, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 286 (1969) (undermining rationales for parent-child immunity
doctrine).
41. See supra text accompanying note 29.
42. See Hollister, supra note 40, at 497.
43. See Hollister, supra note 40, at 498.
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another.44 Last, a state may statutorily prohibit inheritance of a child's recovery
by a wrongdoing parent.
45
The depletion of family funds rationale46 is weakened by the wide availabil-
ity of insurance coverage in these actions.47 Moreover, this rationale implies
that an injured child does not deserve special compensation even though his or
her needs become greater than other siblings by virtue of the injury.
48
The third justification for parent-child immunity, the danger of fraud and
collusion, 49 has been refuted by courts and commentators alike. Both point out
that fraudulent claims are possibilities in any suit,50 yet the law does not prevent
actions between other family members.51
The final two arguments in support of parental immunity, maintenance of
parental discipline52 and promotion of family harmony,53 are the only ones that
currently lend some legitimacy to the immunity doctrine. Nonetheless, courts
and commentators have also diluted the validity of these arguments. With re-
spect to the maintenance of parental control, some courts have retained immu-
nity when parents legitimately exercise their authority or discretion while
fulfilling legal duties.54 Other courts have developed flexible standards regard-
ing the parental right to manage the household.55 In addition, most parent-
child suits arise in the context of motor vehicle accidents and therefore parental
discipline or control is not at issue.
56
Many courts also have undermined the strongest argument in support of
parental immunity, the protection of family harmony, for a variety of reasons.
44. See infra note 51.
45. See Hollister, supra note 40, at 498 (wrongful death statutes may prevent tortfeasor parent
from recovering when child dies from tortious injury).
46. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
47. See, eg., Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 768, 611 P.2d 135, 141-42 (1980);
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193-94, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531-32
(1969); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 412, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
48, See Hollister, supra note 40, at 499-500.
49. See supra text accompanying note 32.
50. See, eg., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 919-20, 479 P.2d 648, 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292
(1971) (en banc); GeIbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 438-39, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529, 532 (1969); Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 833, 113 S.E.2d 875, 878 (1960); Hollister, supra
note 40, at 500-02; McCurdy, supra note 40, at 1072-73.
51. See, eg., Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 165 A.2d 335 (1960) (permitting suit
between siblings); Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960) (permitting suit between
brothers). As one court stated:
"It would be a sad commentary on the law if we were to admit that the judicial processes
are so ineffective that we must deny relief to a person otherwise entitled because in some
future case a litigant may be guilty of fraud or collusion. Once that concept were accepted,
then all causes of action should be abolished. Our legal system is not that ineffectual."
Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 920, 479 P.2d 648, 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292 (1971) (en banc)
(quoting Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 696, 376 P.2d 70, 73, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 105 (1962) (en
banc)).
52. See supra text accompanying note 31.
53. See supra text accompanying note 25.
54. See supra note 39.
55. See supra note 39.
56. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 920-21, 479 P.2d 648, 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292
(1971); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 406, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
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First, courts have noted that it is the injury to the child that disturbs family
harmony rather than a subsequent lawsuit.5 7 Second, the family harmony ra-
tionale fails when insurance coverage funds the recovery.5 8 In the context of a
lawsuit, a parent's liability insurance coverage protects the parent, while com-
pensating the injured child, and may even promote family harmony. Third, it is
inconsistent to deny a personal injury suit between parent and child on the basis
of family harmony when children can sue their parents in contract, property,
and trespass actions.5 9 Finally, maintenance of parental immunity based on
family harmony is even less defensible in states that have abrogated interspousal
immunity.
6 °
Despite the criticisms of the doctrine, North Carolina has retained some
form of parental immunity since 1923. Almost every North Carolina case in-
volving a suit between parent and child, however, has arisen in the context of a
motor vehicle accident. Indeed, North Carolina judicially adopted the parent-
child immunity doctrine in Small v. Morrison,61 a case involving a motor vehicle
accident. Plaintiff in Small, a nine-year-old child, sustained injuries when the
car in which she was riding collided with another vehicle. 62 Plaintiff sued her
father, who operated the car in which she was riding, his insurance company,
and the driver of the second car, alleging that one or both drivers were negli-
gent.63 The North Carolina Supreme Court held that plaintiff had no right to
sue her father in tort because of the parent-child immunity doctrine. The court
dismissed plaintiff's action against the insurance company, whose obligation to
pay derived from a judgment against the father. 64 In deciding to adopt parent-
child immunity, the court relied on "practical considerations of public policy,
which discourage causes of action that tend to destroy parental authority and to
undermine the security of the home."' 65 The majority further indicated that no
57. See, ag., Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 360, 339 N.E.2d 907, 913 (1975); Falco v.
Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 380, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (1971).
58. See Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970) (en bane); Gelbman v.
Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193-94, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531-32 (1969); Goller v.
White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 412, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
59. See, eg., Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 A. 292 (1925) (suit by adopted child against
her mother to have trust agreement set aside); Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895) (suit
by children against their mother for rental value of her use and occupation of their home); see also
Quinn v. Thigpen, 266 N.C. 720, 147 S.E.2d 191 (1966) (suit by child against father to enforce
contract); Dunn v. Beaman, 126 N.C. 766, 36 S.E. 172 (1900) (suit by child against parent for
conversion of property); Walker v. Crowder, 37 N.C. 478 (1843) (action brought by children against
father for property waste).
60. See McCurdy, supra note 40, at 1074-77 (suggesting that a suit between husband and wife is
no less disruptive of family harmony than a suit between parent and child); Comment, Intrafamily
Tort Liability-A Situation of Confused Disparity, 5 CUMB. L. REv. 273 (1974) (describing inconsis-
tencies between parent-child and interspousal immunity doctrines).
61. 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923). In Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E.2d 753
(1965), the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized the reciprocity of the parent-child immunity
doctrine, indicating that unemancipated minor children are immune from personal tort actions by
their parents. Id. at 321, 139 S.E.2d at 757.
62. Small, 185 N.C. at 578, 118 S.E. at 12.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 579, 118 S.E. at 12.
65. Id. at 584, 118 S.E. at 15. In an emotional outpouring, the court further stated:
In youth the currents of life are prodigal in their racing course, and we should be slow to
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common law authority existed to support a personal injury action by a minor
unemancipated child against a negligent parent.6 6 In his voluminous dissent,
however, Justice Clark disclaimed the majority's holding, referring to the ab-
sence of English common law precedent supporting parental immunity.67 In
addition, Justice Clark criticized the majority's reliance on Hewlett on the basis
that the case created the parent-child immunity doctrine without any foundation
in statutory or common law.
6 8
The immunity doctrine in North Carolina was next applied in Goldsmith v.
Samet 69 to deny a wrongful death action brought on behalf of an unemanci-
pated minor against his mother. The child died in an automobile accident aris-
ing from the negligent act of his father, who was driving the mother's
automobile as her agent.70 The court reasoned that no one could bring a wrong-
ful death action on the child's behalf because parental immunity would have
barred the child from suing his mother.71 Moreover, because the child died
intestate, any recovery ultimately would be divided between his parents-the
two wrongdoers. 7 2 Although this outcome is precisely one that the parental
immunity doctrine seeks to avoid, immunity is not necessary to achieve this end.
Instead, wrongful death statutes can disallow recovery by those who precipitated
the fatal injury.
73
During the next twenty years North Carolina courts had little occasion to
apply the parent-child immunity doctrine, yet they did carve out an exception to
its application. In Wright v. Wright 74 the North Carolina Supreme Court first
considered the application of parental immunity to the doctrine of respondeat
superior.7 5 In Wright a child sustained injuries while riding in a cab that his
father drove negligently in the course of employment.76 The court allowed suit
encourage or to permit a minor, in the household of its parents, unemancipated and who
has not yet arrived at the age of discretion.... to run the risk of losing a priceless birth-
right and a rich inheritance in an effort to gain for the moment a mere mess of pottage, or a
few pieces of silver. If this restraining doctrine were not announced by any of the writers
of the common law, because no such case was ever brought before the courts of England, it
was unmistakably and indelibly carved upon the tablets of Mount Sinai.
Id. at 585-86, 118 S.E. at 16.
66. Id. at 586, 118 S.E. at 16.
67. Id. at 591-92, 118 S.E. at 18-19 (Clark, J., dissenting) (noting that "no judge in England has
ever at any time held that a child could not maintain an action against its father").
68. Id.
69. 201 N.C. 574, 160 S.E. 835 (1931).
70. Id. at 574, 160 S.E. at 835.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 575, 160 S.E. at 835.
73. Hollister, supra note 40, at 498.
74. 229 N.C. 503, 50 S.E.2d 540 (1948).
75. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior a master (employer) is responsible for the negli-
gence of a servant (employee) toward those to whom the master (employer) owes a duty to use care,
provided the servant's (employee's) negligence occurred in the course of his employment. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1179 (5th ed. 1979). The doctrines of respondeat superior and parental immunity
arise together when a parent injures a child in the course of the parent's employment. As held in
Wright, the employee's personal immunity from suit because of the domestic relation does not ex-
tend to the employer and therefore cancel his liability, because the employer is liable directly under
the principle of respondeat superior. Wright, 229 N.C. at 507-08, 50 S.E.2d at 543-44.
76. Wright, 229 N.C. at 504, 50 S.E.2d at 541.
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by the child against the father's employer even though the child could not have
sued his father.77 Distinguishing Small,78 the court held that the employer was
directly, not derivatively, liable for acts of its employees.79 The court further
extended this reasoning in Foy v. Foy Electric Co. 80 by permitting a child, who
was injured as a result of her father's negligent operation of a truck in the course
of his employment, to sue the employer despite her father's fifty percent owner-
ship of the corporate employer's outstanding stock.8 1
Less than thirty years after the doctrine's adoption, the North Carolina
Supreme Court in 1952 heard the first argument to abrogate the parent-child
immunity doctrine in Redding v. Redding.8 2 The court left the doctrine undis-
turbed, indicating that no other jurisdiction had yet abolished the doctrine and
that the general assembly had not changed North Carolina's "common law."
'8 3
By the early 1970s North Carolina courts had applied the parent-child im-
munity doctrine on numerous occasions.84 Plaintiffs, however, continued to
press for abrogation of the doctrine.8 5 In Skinner v. Whitley 86 plaintiff urged
the North Carolina Supreme Court to abolish parental immunity in the context
of automobile accidents.8 7 Noting the difficulties that would arise if it estab-
lished an exception to the immunity doctrine,88 the supreme court concluded
that such partial abolition "would create more problems and inequities than it
77. Id. at 506-07, 50 S.E.2d at 543.
78. 185 N.C. at 577, 118 S.E. at 12. For a discussion of Small, see supra text accompanying
notes 61-68.
79. Wright, 229 N.C. at 507, 50 S.E.2d at 543-44. The Wright court noted the absence of a
master-servant relationship in Small, and also noted that the Small court predicated the insurance
company's liability on a judgment against the child's father. Id.
80. 231 N.C. 161, 56 S.E.2d 418 (1949).
81. Id.
82. 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952).
83. Id. at 639-40, 70 S.E.2d at 677.
84. See Watson v. Nichols, 270 N.C. 733, 155 S.E.2d 154 (1967) (holding that because a parent
is not liable in a direct action by his or her child due to parental immunity, parent cannot be held
liable by cross action); Lewis v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 243 N.C. 55, 89 S.E.2d 788
(1955) (child's estate administrator could not maintain an action for contribution against child's
mother because parental immunity would have prevented child himself from suing); see also Foster
v. Foster, 264 N.C. 694, 142 S.E.2d 638 (1965) (holding that minor child could not sue her mother
for injuries sustained as result of her mother's negligent driving, but child's father could sue mother
to recover medical expenses expended by him on behalf of daughter); Cummings v. Locklear, 12
N.C. App. 572, 182 S.E.2d 832, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 726, 184 S.E.2d 883 (1971) (wife has right to
sue husband for personal injury regardless of fact that unemancipated children were beneficiaries of
any recovery).
85. In three cases plaintiffs urged North Carolina courts to abrogate the parental immunity
doctrine. See Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 189 S.E.2d 230 (1972); Mabry v. Bowen, 14 N.C.
App. 646, 188 S.E.2d 651 (1972); Evans v. Evans, 12 N.C. App. 17, 182 S.E.2d 227, cert. denied, 279
N.C. 394, 183 S.E.2d 242 (1971), cert denied, 405 U.S. 925 (1972).
86. 281 N.C. 476, 189 S.E.2d 230 (1972) (action by estates of two minor daughters against
estate of their father who allegedly caused their deaths by negligently operating an automobile).
87. Id. at 479, 189 S.E.2d at 232. In Skinner no family relationship remained for the court to
protect. Nonetheless, the supreme court refused to limit or abolish parent-child immunity, noting
"the troublesome difficulties encountered by those who seek to modify, but not repudiate, the parent-
child immunity rule." Id. at 482, 189 S.E.2d at 234.
88. Id. at 482-83, 189 S.E.2d at 234.
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[would cure]."' 89 The court also rejected total abrogation of the doctrine because
it "would lead to judicial supervision over the conduct of parent and child in the
ordinary operation of the household." 90 The court deferred to the general as-
sembly any alteration of parent-child immunity, asserting that legislative action
would avoid "judicial piecemeal changes in a case-by-case approach." 9 1
Following the decision in Skinner, the North Carolina General Assembly in
1975 adopted a legislative piecemeal approach and abolished parental immunity
only in motor vehicle cases. 92 The current version of North Carolina General
Statutes section 1-539.21 provides: "The relationship of parent and child shall
not bar the right of action by a person or his estate against his parent for wrong-
ful death, personal injury, or property damage arising out of operation of a mo-
tor vehicle owned or operated by the parent."'93 Two implications underlie this
statute. First, the general assembly essentially has repudiated the validity of
most of the justifications traditionally advanced in support of parental immu-
nity.94 North Carolina's compulsory automobile liability insurance law95 un-
doubtedly buttressed the general assembly's decision to abrogate immunity in
motor vehicle cases. When a child sues a parent and the parent has adequate
insurance coverage, the danger of disrupting family accord or depleting family
funds is eliminated. 96 Unlike some states that limit an injured child's recovery
to the amount of the parent's insurance policy,97 however, section 1-539.21 has
no such limitation. Thus, in North Carolina a child injured by a parent's negli-
gent operation of a motor vehicle presumably can recover beyond the parent's
policy limit. Therefore, the general assembly has impliedly rejected both the
preservation of family harmony and assets rationales for recognizing parental
immunity, at least in the context of motor vehicle accidents.
Second, by failing to abolish parental immunity completely, the general as-
89, Id. at 483, 189 S.E.2d at 234. The court also noted that the existence of automobile liability
insurance was not a valid reason to abolish the immunity doctrine. Id.
90, Id. at 484, 189 S.E.2d at 235.
91. Id.
92, Act of June 19, 1975, oh. 685, § 1, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 911, 911 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-539.21 (1975)); supra note 7 (text of enactment); see infra text accompanying note 93
(amended version of statute).
The North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of § 1-539.21 in Ledwell v.
Berry, 39 N.C. App. 224, 249 S.E.2d 862 (1978), cert denied, 296 N.C. 585, 254 S.E.2d 35 (1979).
The statute, however, does not permit a parent to sue his or her minor child for negligently caused
personal injury. Id.
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Supp. 1985). Carver v. Carver, 310 N.C. 669, 314 S.E.2d 739
(1984), expanded the statute to include wrongful death actions in addition to actions for personal
injury or property damage. Id. at 672-73, 314 S.E.2d at 742.
94. For a discussion of these justifications, see supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -284 (1983). The North Carolina Motor Vehicle Safety
and Financial Responsibility Act requires all owners of motor vehicles to carry automobile liability
insurance, issued by an insurance company authorized to transact business in North Carolina, to
insure against loss from liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance, or use of such motor vehicle. Id. § 20-279.21(a), (b)(2).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48, 58.
97. See, eg., Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 673 (Del. 1976); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066,
1067 (Fla. 1982); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 352-53, 339 N.E.2d 907, 908-09 (1975); Unah
v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Okla. 1984).
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sembly accepted by implication that parents should be able to supervise and
discipline their children without the threat of liability. The recent decision in
Snow v. Nixon,98 however, suggests that parents in North Carolina are not im-
mune when they negligently supervise their children. In Snow defendant mother
was driving her daughter around the neighborhood for the purpose of "trick-or-
treating."9 9 After stopping at one location, the daughter alighted from the car
into the path of an oncoming vehicle.100 The child sued the driver who hit her,
who in turn sued the child's mother for contribution, alleging "negligent protec-
tion, control and supervision of plaintiff while [the mother] was operating a mo-
tor vehicle." 10 1 The North Carolina Court of Appeals refused to apply parental
immunity and upheld a cause of action for contribution against the child's
mother on the ground that the child's injuries "arose out of the operation of a
motor vehicle."' 0 2 Holding the mother liable, the court of appeals reasoned that
the operator of a motor vehicle owes a duty to his or her passengers to unload
them in a safe place, especially when the passengers are children.
10 3
The decision in Snow goes beyond the plain language of section 1-539.21.
Under normal circumstances a parent operating a motor vehicle is not function-
ing in a supervisory capacity over his or her child. In Snow, however, the
mother clearly was in a position to exercise supervision over her child's activity
in exiting the car. Thus, the court's decision essentially extends abolition of
immunity beyond a parent's mere negligent driving to include negligent supervi-
sion of passengers riding in the automobile. As a result, Snow impinges on the
last viable rationale for retaining parental immunity-to protect the realm of
parental supervision. 1 4
Based on the historical development of parental immunity in North Caro-
lina, the decision in Lee presents three questions for legal analysis. First, did the
court apply parent-child immunity properly to bar defendant's right to contribu-
tion under North Carolina's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act?10 5
Second, should North Carolina retain the parental immunity doctrine or further
abrogate it? Third, did the court in Lee legitimately refrain from judicial legisla-
tion or should further abrogation of parental immunity come from the judiciary?
The first question presented by Lee is whether the court properly applied
parental immunity to bar defendant Mowett's right to contribution under North
Carolina's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. The majority relied
98. 52 N.C. App. 131, 277 S.E.2d 850 (1981).
99. Id. at 132, 277 S.E.2d at 851.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 131, 277 S.E.2d at 850.
102. Id. at 135, 277 S.E.2d at 853.
103. Id. at 134-35, 277 S.E.2d at 852-53 (citing Colson v. Shaw, 301 N.C. 677, 273 S.E.2d 243
(1981)).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-1(a) (1983). The statute provides that "where two or more persons
become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or for the same
wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been
recovered against all or any of them." Id.
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on Watson v. Nichols106 to dismiss defendant's action against plaintiff's father.
Confronted with an issue identical to that in Lee, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held in Watson that because a parent is not liable in a direct action by his
or her child, the parent cannot be made liable by cross-action.10 7 Although the
Watson court cited no authority to support its holding, a prior North Carolina
case reached the same conclusion. 108 Indeed, the majority of jurisdictions hold
that a defendant has no claim for contribution against a parent when the injured
child has no cause of action against such parent because of parental immu-
nity. 10 9 To hold otherwise would afford a defendant greater rights than the in-
jured child. Moreover, to allow a claim for contribution against a negligent
parent ultimately would reduce the value of the child's recovery. 11o
In his dissenting opinion in Lee, Justice Exum criticized the majority's ap-
plication of parental immunity to bar defendant Mowett's action for contribu-
tion against the child's allegedly negligent father.1 1 Justice Exum emphasized
that "[n]one of the policy reasons said to justify parental immunity against ordi-
nary tort actions by children appertain to cross-claims by third-party plaintiffs
who are not children of the defendant." 112 He deemed the decision an "unwar-
ranted extension" of the immunity doctrine and argued that contribution actions
by third parties against parents do not adversely affect harmonious family
relations. 1
13
Justice Exum's dissent reflects the conflict between the doctrine of parental
immunity and the statutory right to contribution. North Carolina's contribution
statute provides that "where two or more persons become jointly or severally
liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or for the same wrongful
death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has
not been recovered against all or any of them." 114 Thus, when a minor child
sustains an injury due to the joint negligence of a parent and a third party,
courts must balance the rights of the parent, the child, and the third party. The
public policy to maintain family harmony and parental freedom of supervision
competes with the inequity of permitting "the entire burden of a loss ... to be
shouldered onto one alone . . . while the [other] goes scot free."115 Conse-
106. 270 N.C. 733, 155 S.E.2d 154 (1967).
107. Id. at 735, 155 S.E.2d at 156.
108. See Lewis v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 243 N.C. 55, 56-57, 89 S.E.2d 788, 789
(1955).
109. See, e.g., Jennings v. Franz Torwegge Mach. Works, 347 F. Supp. 1288, 1290 (W.D. Va.
1972) (applying Virginia law); Strahorn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 50 Del. 50, 54-55, 123 A.2d 107,
109-10 (1956); Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 205-06, 610 P.2d 560, 564 (1980); Kendall v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 634 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Mo. 1982).
110. See Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 47, 324 N.E.2d 338, 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 868-
69 (1974) (noting that "[t]he reality of the family is that, except in cases of great wealth, it is a single
economic unit and recovery by a third party against the parent ultimately diminishes the value of the
child's recovery").
111. Lee, 316 N.C. at 496-97, 342 S.E.2d at 886 (Exum, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 496, 342 S.E.2d at 886 (Exum, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 496-97, 342 S.E.2d at 886 (Exum, J., dissenting).
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IB-1(a) (1983).
115. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 337-38 (W'. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
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quently, a minority of jurisdictions recognize the right of a third party to sue a
joint tortfeasor parent for contribution despite the parent's immunity to suit by
his or her child. 116 These courts allow third-party contribution actions against
parents on grounds of equity or public policy.1 17 Moreover, these same courts
view immunity only as a procedural bar to suit by the child, while the parent
remains substantively liable for contribution by third parties.
1 18
By balancing conflicting rights in favor of parental immunity, the supreme
court's decision in Lee represents a strengthening of the parental immunity doc-
trine in North Carolina. The court did not explore the competing rights of con-
tribution and parental immunity, but implied that the social benefits of parental
immunity outweigh society's interest in dividing liability among joint
tortfeasors.
As a result of the outcome in Lee, the question arises whether North Caro-
lina should retain the parental immunity doctrine as it now exists or should
further limit or abrogate the doctrine. The abolition of parental immunity in
motor vehicle cases essentially denies the logic of the doctrine and suggests that
North Carolina should eliminate it altogether. The decision in Snow119 further
illustrates that North Carolina courts are moving beyond abrogation only in
pure motor vehicle cases involving negligent driving. If North Carolina further
abolishes parental immunity, however, the courts or the general assembly must
decide how far to abrogate the doctrine. The challenge will be to balance the
desirability of parental freedom in childrearing against the child's right to just
compensation.
Other jurisdictions that have partially or wholly abolished parental immu-
nity provide alternatives to North Carolina's limited abrogation. 120 These juris-
dictions seek to balance an injured minor child's right to recovery against a
parent's right to exercise both authority and supervision over the child. One
approach is that taken by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Goller v. White.121
Goller involved a suit by a twelve-year-old boy against his foster father for negli-
116. See, e.g., Perchell v. District of Columbia, 444 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Joseph v. Quest,
414 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1982); Hartigan v. Beery, 128 Ill. App. 3d 195, 470 N.E.2d 571 (1984); Walker
v. Milton, 263 La. 555, 268 So. 2d 654 (1972); Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955).
117. See Perchell v. District of Columbia, 444 F.2d 997, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that
District of Columbia could seek contribution from a negligent parent because result of burdening
one party with a joint tort "serv[ed] one equitable purpose but creat[ed] an inequity"); see also
Hartigan v. Beery, 128 Ill. App. 3d 195, 199, 470 N.E.2d 571, 573 (1984) (use of parent-child immu-
nity to insulate parents from contribution action not consistent with present system of equitable
apportionment of fault); Moon v. Thompson, 127 Ill. App. 3d 657, 661, 469 N.E.2d 365, 368 (1984)
(in negligent supervision case involving parents' violation of a statutory duty, public policy concerns
supporting contribution must prevail over conflicting principle of immunity). But see Duensing v.
Tripp, 596 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (holding that an essential element of contribution is that
third-party defendant parent must be liable to plaintiff for same injury).
118. See Walker v. Milton, 263 La. 555, 560-61, 268 So. 2d 654, 656 (1972) (citing Deshotel v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 257 La. 567, 243 So. 2d 259 (1971)); Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864, 866-67
(Utah 1981) (citing Zarella v. Miller, 100 R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673 (1966)).
119. 52 N.C. App. at 131, 277 S.E.2d at 850. For a discussion of Snow, seesupra text accompa-
nying notes 98-104.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 121-45.
121. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
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gently permitting the child to ride on the drawbar of a tractor.1 22 The boy sus-
tained injuries when a bolt protruding from one of the tractor's wheels caught
the leg of his trousers.123 In holding the father liable for negligence, the court
abrogated the parental immunity doctrine in all but two situations. The court
stated that immunity would apply when (1) the allegedly negligent act involves
an exercise of parental authority over the child; or (2) the allegedly negligent act
involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with regard to the provision
of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care.
124
The difficulty with the Goller approach is delineating which parental activi-
ties involve the exercise of authority or discretion over the child. Much litiga-
tion has centered around the meaning of "ordinary parental discretion with
respect to the provision of ... other care." 12 5 In Lemmen v. Servais12 6 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that a child's parents could not be held
liable for their alleged negligent failure to instruct their child properly as to how
to leave a bus and cross a highway.12 7 This "parental activity" involved a fail-
ure to educate and fell within the scope of "discretion with respect to other
care." However, the same court in Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Trans-
port Co. 128 determined that negligent supervision of a child does not fall within
the ambit of parental discretion, reasoning that the exclusion does not extend to
"the broad care one gives to a child in day-to-day affairs."
129
There are two major weaknesses in the Goller approach to abrogating pa-
rental immunity. First, by immunizing two categories of parental behavior, the
court implicitly recognized that any parental action that can be classified under
either category is acceptable. Drawing lines between parental conduct that can
be classified within the authority or discretion exceptions has also proved diffi-
cult, and the Wisconsin decisions provide little guidance to parents in assessing
areas of potential liability. 130 Second, retention of certain categories of parental
behavior is illogical because it suggests that the traditional justifications for im-
munity are still valid in specific situations.
1 3 1
The California Supreme Court took an alternative approach in Gibson v.
122. Id. at 404, 122 N.W.2d at 193.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
125. Id.
126. 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968).
127. Id.
128. 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972).
129. Id. at 247, 201 N.W.2d at 753. In Thoreson a mother incurred liability when she left her
three-year-old son alone watching television in their living room. The child later ran out of the
house into the path of a bus. Id. at 233, 201 N.W.2d at 747. Narrowly confining the scope of the
"other care" exception, the court indicated that negligent supervision was not of the same legal
nature as providing food, clothing, and the like. Id. at 247, 201 N.W.2d at 753; see also Howes v.
Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972) (mother's failure to supervise and control her son's
actions and movements does not fall within either immunity exception); Cole v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 177 N.W.2d 866 (1970) (parental supervision of child's play does not fall within
"other care" immunity exception).
130. Hollister, supra note 40, at 514.
131. Hollister, supra note 40, at 514-16.
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Gibson 132 by completely abrogating the immunity doctrine and adopting a rea-
sonable parent standard.133 The court in Gibson rejected "the implication of
Goller that within certain aspects of the parent-child relationship, the parent has
carte blanche to act negligently toward his child." 134 Instead, the California
Supreme Court adopted the following test of parental conduct: "What would an
ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar circum-
stances?" 135 Under the Gibson test reasonableness is to be evaluated in light of
the parental role.136 This approach clearly balances the rights of an injured
child more favorably than the Goller approach because all parental duties and
activities fall under the purview of the test. The Gibson approach assumes there
is a clear distinction between acceptable and unacceptable parental conduct re-
gardless of the capacity in which a parent acts. However, the test presumably
encompasses considerations of parental judgment, forgetfulness, and frailties in-
herent in household management.
1 37
The major criticism of the Gibson approach is that courts cannot and
should not decide what constitutes reasonable parental behavior in the realm of
supervision and discipline. As noted by one court, the result of a Gibson
approach
would be to circumscribe the wide range of discretion a parent ought
to have in permitting his child to undertake responsibility and gain
independence. . . . Considering the different economic, educational,
cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds which must prevail, there
are so many combinations and permutations of parent-child relation-
ships that may result that the search for a standard would necessarily
be in vain .... 138
All of these various parental and household characteristics, however, pre-
sumably are to be considered in a determination of reasonable behavior 139 be-
cause the standard is a flexible one to be developed on a case-by-case basis. 14°
Nevertheless, courts are especially uncomfortable with allowing judicial review
of negligent supervision cases because almost every accident could have been
prevented by closer parental supervision.141
132. 3 Cal. 3d914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (en banc).
133. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293; see also Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d
595 (Minn. 1980) (adopting reasonable parent standard).
134. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 921, 479 P.2d at 652-53, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93.
135. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
136. Id.
137. Id. The California courts have not had occasion to develop the reasonable parent test. In
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182
(1978) (en banc), the California Supreme Court did not apply the reasonable parent test but refused
to dismiss a cross-claim brought against parents of an unemancipated minor boy for their alleged
negligent failure to supervise. The parents had signed a consent form allowing their son to partici-
pate in a motorcycle race that resulted in the child's injury. Id.
138. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 50, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 871
(1974).
139. Comment, The "Reasonable Parent" Standard: An Alternative to Parent-Child Tort Immu-
nity, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 795, 810 (1976).
140. Id. at 809.
141. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 45-46, 324 N.E.2d 338, 343, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 867
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A final alternative to parental immunity is provided in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. The Restatement view advocates a parental reasonableness
standard, but exemplifies the kind of parental activities that should not give rise
to liability. 142 The Restatement approach erases any immunity that exists solely
by virtue of a familial relationship but recognizes that certain acts and omissions
between parent and child should not be tortious even when injury ensues. 14 3 To
impose liability under the Restatement view, parental conduct must reach the
threshold of palpable unreasonableness. 144 This approach is preferable to the
Gibson test because it provides guidelines to determine what constitutes unrea-
sonable behavior. 145
The third question presented in Lee is whether the court should judicially
legislate further abrogation of parental immunity or defer to the general assem-
bly for any further action. In support of its decision in Lee, the supreme court
stated that "[b]ecause the parent-child immunity doctrine is firmly embedded in
our case law and the legislature has declined to enact its abolition, we do not
disturb the doctrine as it now exists."' 14 6 The court deemed judicial abolition to
constitute "impermissible judicial legislation"1 47 and declared that the doctrine
will continue undisturbed until the general assembly acts to abolish or amend it.
The supreme court characterized its position as one of impotence in changing
common law or precedential doctrine.
148
The court, however, is not powerless to abrogate the parent-child immunity
doctrine, as evidenced by its prospective action in analogous decisions. 149 North
(1974). One commentator has suggested that the proper test "would [hold] the parent liable only if
the accident could have been prevented by closer supervision and it would have been reasonable for
the parent to have more closely supervised the child at the time of the accident." Comment, supra
note 139, at 812.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1977).
143. Id. As stated in the Restatement:
The intimacies of family life... involve intended physical contacts that would be actiona-
ble between strangers but may be commonplace and expected within the family. Family
romping, even roughhouse play and momentary flares of temper not producing serious
hurt, may be normal in many households, to the point that the privilege arising from con-
sent becomes analogous.
Id. § 895G comment k.
144. Id.
145. Id. For example, when a parent "delays fixing a slightly broken step" and a child is conse-
quently injured, liability will not arise under the Restatement approach because such an occurrence
is commonplace in family life and usually treated as an accident. Id.
146. Lee, 316 N.C. at 490, 342 S.E.2d at 883.
147. Id. at 494, 342 S.E.2d at 885.
148. The supreme court stated that "[tlo judicially abolish the parent-child immunity doctrine
after the legislature has considered and retained the doctrine would be to engage in impermissible
judicial legislation." Id.
149. In State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 276 S.E.2d 450 (1981), the North Carolina Supreme
Court modified a common-law rule preventing spouses from testifying against each other in a crimi-
nal proceeding. Claiming that absent a legislative declaration, the court had authority to alter judi-
cially created common law, the supreme court restricted the prohibition of spousal testimony to
confidential communication during the marriage. Id. at 593, 276 S.E.2d at 452.
In Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967), the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court abolished the common law rule of charitable immunity as applied to hospitals.
Explaining its departure from stare decisis, the court stated that "[t]here is no virtue in sinning
against light or in persisting in palpable error, for nothing is settled until it is settled right." Id. at
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Carolina courts have altered judicially-created common-law rules with public
policy ramifications on numerous occasions.150 Thus, the supreme court's defer-
ence to the general assembly on the issue of parental immunity is not mandated
by judicial precedent. Indeed, in his dissent to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals decision in Lee, Judge Becton opined that because North Carolina
courts created parental immunity by relying on other states' decisions, they
should be able to alter it in the same way. 151 Moreover, other jurisdictions have
indicated that the legislature is not the proper body to abolish the judicially-
created parent-child immunity doctrine.
15 2
The erosion of the policy rationales for parental immunity that prompted
the North Carolina General Assembly to abrogate the immunity doctrine in mo-
tor vehicle cases suggests that further abrogation is logically warranted. The
argument for abrogation is further supported by the inequities potentially in-
flicted on negligent third parties who, unable to seek contribution from a jointly
negligent parent, must bear the full burden of compensation regardless of rela-
tive fault. Although the majority of North Carolina cases have arisen in the
context of motor vehicle accidents, this situation should neither retard change
nor excuse judicial apprehension in abrogating the doctrine.
Both the "reasonable parent standard" and the Restatement view represent
viable alternatives to retention of the immunity doctrine. These approaches
more equally balance the rights of parent and child. In addition, thcoe views
allow for the consideration of all parental and household characteristics in the
determination of parental negligence and therefore adequately protect freedom
in childrearing.
It is time for the North Carolina Supreme Court to reconsider the benefits
and inequities flowing from the parental immunity doctrine and use its judicial
powers to instigate change. The advantage to judicial abolition is that courts
may more readily accommodate the uniqueness of the parent-child relationship
by reserving desired exceptions to total abrogation 153 or promulgating tests and
20-21, 152 S.E.2d at 498 (quoting Spitzer v. Commissioners of Franklin County, 188 N.C. 30, 32,
123 S.E. 636, 638 (1924)).
150. See, eg., Mims v. Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 286 S.E.2d 779 (1982) (presumption of gift in inter-
spousal property conveyances applied equally to husband and wife); Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham
Memorial Hosp., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980) (recognizing cause of action for spouse's loss
of consortium when joined with personal injury action); Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254
S.E.2d 611 (1979) (recognizing that under certain circumstances the law authorizes an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Sides v. Duke Hosp., 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818,
cert denied, 312 N.C. 331, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985) (recognizing exception to at-will employment doc-
trine); Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584 (1983) (recognizing cause of action for
selling or serving alcoholic beverages to visibly intoxicated tavern patrons).
151. Lee, 76 N.C. App. at 565, 334 S.E.2d at 256 (Becton, J., dissenting).
152. See, eg., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 n.51 (Alaska 1967); Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d
669, 673 (Del. 1976); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 619, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 (1956); Turner v.
Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 787 (Iowa 1981); Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 639 (Me. 1979); Fugate
v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 668 (Mo. 1979); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 434, 224 A.2d 588, 590
(1966); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 437, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 530
(1969).
153. See, eg., Goller, 20 Wis. 2d at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198 (1963) (abrogating immunity with
reserved exceptions); see supra text accompanying notes 121-24.
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guidelines to replace the immunity doctrine. 154
BETH ANN FALK
154. See, e.g., Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (1971) (adopting
reasonable parent test); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980) (adopting reason-
able parent test); see supra text accompanying notes 132-37, 142-45.
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